Optimal control of fractional punishment in optional public goods game
Punishment is probably the most frequently used mechanism to increase cooperation in Public Goods Games (PGG); however, it is expensive. To address this problem, this paper introduces an optimal control problem that uses fractional punishment to promote cooperation. We present a series of computatio...
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| Outros autores: | , |
| Formato: | article |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| Publicado: |
2024
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| Subjects: | |
| Acceso en liña: | https://doi.org/10.5540/tcam.2024.025.e01737 http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14066/4611 |
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| Summary: | Punishment is probably the most frequently used mechanism to increase cooperation in Public Goods Games (PGG); however, it is expensive. To address this problem, this paper introduces an optimal control problem that uses fractional punishment to promote cooperation. We present a series of computational experiments illustrating the effects of single and combined terms of the optimization cost function. In the findings, the optimal controller outperforms the use of constant fractional punishment and gives an insight into the period and size of the penalization to be implemented with respect to the defection in the game. |
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